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Abstract
Environmental stimuli can provoke specific response tendencies depending on their incentive valence. While some studies 
report positive-approach and negative-avoidance biases, others find no such mappings. To further illuminate the relationship 
between incentive valence and action requirement, we combined a cued monetary incentive paradigm with an approach/
avoidance joystick task. Incentive type was manipulated between groups: The reward group won money, while the punishment 
group avoided losing money for correct and fast responses to targets following incentive cues. Depending on their orienta-
tions, targets had to be ‘approached’ or ‘avoided’. Importantly, incentive valence (signaled by cue color) was orthogonal to 
action requirement (target orientation). Moreover, targets could carry valence-associated information or not (target color), 
which was, however, task-irrelevant. First, we observed that both valence cues (reward/punishment) improved performance 
compared to neutral cues, independent of the required action (approach/avoid), suggesting that advance valence cues do not 
necessarily produce specific action biases. Second, task-irrelevant valence associations with targets promoted action biases, 
with valence-associated targets facilitating approach and impairing avoid responses. Importantly, this approach bias for 
valence-associated targets was observed in both groups and hence occurred independently of absolute valence (‘unsigned’). 
This rather unexpected finding might be related to the absence of a direct contrast between positive valence and negative 
valence within groups and the common goal to respond fast and accurately in all incentive trials. Together, our results seem 
to challenge the notion that monetary incentives trigger ‘hard-wired’ valence–action biases in that specific design choices 
seem to modulate the presence and/or direction of valence–action biases.
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Introduction
To make optimal decisions when facing several possible 
courses of action, people have to recognize environmental 
stimuli as positive or negative, and to decide how to respond 
to them appropriately. Theoretical accounts assume that at 
least two systems are involved in the regulation of behav-
ior in response to different kinds of stimuli (e.g., Konorski, 
1967; Thayer, 1989). Specifically, the so-called Behavioral 
Activation System would be concerned with approaching 
appetitive stimuli, whereas the Behavioral Inhibition Sys-
tem deals with withdrawal or avoidance of aversive stimuli 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Gray, 1990). As such, these two 
systems are assumed to induce behavioral facilitation when 
a person is required to either approach positive stimuli, or 
avoid negative stimuli.
In previous studies, it was already shown that natural 
valence–action biases can be probed in an experimental 
context by manipulating the attractiveness of stimuli (i.e., 
valence) and action requirement in an orthogonal fashion. 
For instance, in an early behavioral study, participants were 
faster when they were instructed to either pull cards with a 
positive word meaning towards them or to push cards with a 
negative word meaning away. In contrast, participants were 
slower when being instructed to pull negative cards towards 
them or to push positive cards away (Solarz, 1960). These 
valence–action biases for stimuli with an inherent emotional 
content are considered to reflect fairly automatic, hard-wired 
motivational tendencies, which have proven beneficial for 
survival (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Zajonc, 1980).
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To date, numerous studies have described similar 
biases using inherent emotional content in animated 
approach/avoidance computer tasks (Chen & Bargh, 1999; 
Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2010; 
Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003; Phaf, Mohr, Rotteveel, 
& Wicherts, 2014; Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson, & Strack, 
2008). For example, in a set of experiments conducted by 
Krieglmeyer et al. (2010), participants responded to a central 
emotion word by moving a manikin (representing the ‘self’) 
up and down on the screen using two separate buttons. In 
one block, positive words required upward movements and 
negative words required downward movements, while the 
reversed mapping was applied in the other block. In addition, 
the initial location of the manikin changed from trial to trial 
(below or above the word), so that the approach/avoidance 
dimension could be dissociated from the physical movement 
direction. In brief, the authors found valence–action biases, 
i.e., faster distance decreases between the imagined self and 
positive words when approaching these, and faster distance 
increases when avoiding negative words. Interestingly, these 
compatibility effects were observed regardless of the ini-
tial manikin location and physical movement direction (i.e., 
arm flexion or extension), which suggests a fairly automatic 
activation of approach and avoidance action codes for inher-
ently positive and negative events, respectively (Krieglmeyer 
et al., 2010; Markman & Brendl, 2005).
In addition to these studies which applied inherent emo-
tional content, an independent, but clearly related line of 
research and theorizing has described similar valence–action 
biases in the context of reinforcement learning, considering 
both Pavlovian and instrumental learning (Dayan, Niv, Sey-
mour, & Daw, 2006; Geurts, Huys, Den Ouden, & Cools, 
2013; Huys et al., 2010). While the observed biases for 
stimuli with newly acquired valence are very similar to the 
ones found for inherently emotional stimulus material, this 
research focuses on how these associations have been estab-
lished or learned in the first place. One important observa-
tion is that over-learned, automatic Pavlovian responses to 
appetitive and aversive stimuli can interfere with or overrule 
instrumental action-outcome contingencies (Bouton, 1993, 
2007; Guitart-Masip, Duzel, Dolan, & Dayan, 2014), which 
highlights that once established, valence–action associations 
are hard to overcome—just like the ones observed for inher-
ent emotional material.
Other studies demonstrated the occurrence of 
valence–action biases when using monetary incentives 
(reward and punishment) as appetitive and aversive events 
(Freeman, Razhas, & Aron, 2014; Guitart-Masip et al., 
2012; Huys et  al., 2011; Wagenbreth et  al., 2015). For 
example, Guirtart-Masip et al. (2012) developed a Go/noGo 
paradigm in which participants learned to associate different 
cues (fractal images) with certain combinations of incen-
tive valence (reward vs. punishment) and actions (Go vs. 
noGo) in a trial-and-error fashion. Importantly, these map-
pings could be compatible or incompatible with ‘natural’ 
valence–action biases (Go response to win money/noGo 
response to avoid losing money vs. noGo response to win 
money/Go response to avoid losing money). In this para-
digm, significantly increased accuracy rates were observed 
for compatible responses (Go-to-win and noGo-to-avoid-los-
ing) compared to incompatible ones (noGo-to-win and Go-
to-avoid-losing), confirming that learned incentive value sig-
nals can produce similar valence–action biases as emotional 
stimuli. Other studies which employed similar versions of 
this Go/noGo paradigm to study the effects of action and 
valence also found such valence–action couplings. These 
studies report significantly higher accuracy rates for all pos-
sible compatible valence–action mappings (i.e., Go-to-win 
vs. Go-to-avoid-losing and noGo-to-avoid-losing vs. noGo-
to-win; Richter et al. 2014), or at least for some selected 
compatible mappings (Cavanagh, Eisenberg, Guitart-Masip, 
Huys, & Frank, 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011). From the 
above observations, it could be concluded that valence and 
action dimensions are mutually dependent, with a fairly 
automatic tendency to approach reward-related and avoid 
punishment-related stimuli—which parallels approach/
avoidance tendencies to emotional material. Interestingly, 
as a result of this mutual dependency, several studies aimed 
to influence subjective incentive valence towards specific 
unhealthy stimuli by instructing participants to perform an 
avoid response when being presented with such a stimu-
lus (e.g., Becker, Jostmann, Wiers, & Holland, 2015; Kong 
et al., 2015).
In contrast to these observations, other studies have 
found no such biases, i.e., no difference in task performance 
between reward and punishment manipulations. For exam-
ple, in a study employing a selective stop-change task per-
formed by Verbruggen and McLaren (2016), which probes 
inhibitory control processes, no differences were observed 
in performance between a participant group that could earn 
rewards for correct task performance and one which could 
avoid losing money for incorrect performance. This finding 
seems rather inconsistent with the notion reported above of a 
natural mapping between reward-approach and punishment-
avoidance (cf. Guitart-Masip et al., 2012), in that one would 
expect that response inhibition would be facilitated in the 
context of negative valence (here, monetary loss), while 
response execution would be facilitated in the context of 
positive valence (here, monetary win). Earlier studies made 
a similar observation in the visual attention domain (Engel-
mann, Damaraju, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009; Engelmann & 
Pessoa, 2007; Small et al., 2005). Without going into much 
detail, these studies showed that both reward and punish-
ment manipulations lead to similar performance improve-
ments in the form of faster response execution in a forced 
choice task. Now, to relate these observations back to the 
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before-mentioned studies observing valence–action biases, 
we need to consider important paradigmatic differences, 
which might explain these diverging findings. One differ-
ence between studies reporting valence–action biases and 
those that do not is that reward and punishment information 
in the latter are not conveyed by unique stimuli, but in a 
contextual fashion (trial or block cues), which likely pro-
motes a more controlled, strategic approach to maximize 
monetary incentives. Moreover, in the before-mentioned 
studies that did not observed clear valence–action biases 
(including Engelmann et al., 2009; Verbruggen & McLaren, 
2016), response requirements were orthogonal to the valence 
information (involving neither clear approach nor avoidance 
behavior), which is in contrast to the fixed valence–action 
mappings that are often used in a reinforcement learning 
context. Related to this, valence information in the latter 
studies was merely instructed rather than learned over time. 
Finally, it is also possible that these studies failed to observe 
such biases, because the required action was a simple button 
press (or the inhibition of a button press), which might be 
considered as a relatively weak representation of approach/
avoidance behavior.
With the present study, we aimed to bridge between dif-
ferent types of paradigms to test under which circumstances 
putative valence–action biases can occur, thereby also illu-
minating the reasons for seemingly inconsistent findings of 
earlier studies. To do so, we employed a novel cued mon-
etary incentive approach/avoidance task that manipulates 
valence and action in an orthogonal fashion. More spe-
cifically, we wanted to investigate whether valence–action 
biases can be observed when valence and action information 
were separated in time and provided in an orthogonal fashion 
while using an intuitive approach/avoidance manipulation 
(i.e., an animated joystick task) that closely matches studies 
in the emotional domain that observed robust valence–action 
biases (e.g., Krieglmeyer et al., 2010). A second, and more 
exploratory, aim of the present study was to test whether 
coincidental, but entirely irrelevant incentive valence infor-
mation would trigger valence–action biases, assuming that 
a putative hard-wired bias would occur independently of 
goal-directed processes. Specifically, previous studies have 
reported that task-irrelevant valence-related features can 
influence performance, either when these occur in another 
stimulus dimension within the same task (e.g., Krebs, Boe-
hler, Egner, & Woldorff, 2011; Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 
2010) or in an entirely independent subsequent task (e.g., 
Anderson, Folk, Garrison, & Rogers, 2016; Anderson, 
Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2013; Lee & 
Shomstein, 2014; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012). Moreo-
ver, related designs using approach/avoidance manipulations 
to measure the strength of dispositions towards unhealthy 
stimuli (e.g., Wiers, Rinck, Dictus, & van den Wildenberg, 
2009) and to reduce such tendencies (e.g., Becker et al., 
2015) revealed that responding to task-irrelevant valence 
features can possibly provoke valence–action biases as 
well (see also De Houwer, 2003). Based on these studies, 
we expect that task-irrelevant positive and negative incen-
tive signals can affect responses and potentially promote 
valence–action biases.
To this end, we combined a cued monetary incentive 
paradigm with an approach/avoidance joystick task, and 
manipulated incentive valence between two groups of partic-
ipants. The reward group won money, while the punishment 
group prevented losing money by correct and fast responses 
in incentive compared to no-incentive trials. Importantly, 
incentive valence was signaled by the cue color (incentive 
vs. no incentive), while response requirement (push vs. pull 
the joystick) was indicated by the orientation of the subse-
quent target (i.e., response requirement was orthogonal to 
incentive information). In contrast to the previous studies, 
this design entails a separation between the presentation 
of valence information (in the cue) and action information 
(in the target). Moreover, the target could be independently 
drawn in a color which was either associated with incen-
tives or not, but importantly, target color was entirely task-
irrelevant and never predictive of the outcome. As such, par-
ticipants in the reward group were presented with reward 
cues and reward-associated targets, and participants in the 
punishment group were presented with punishment cues 
and punishment-associated targets, which were contrasted 
with neutral, no-incentive conditions in both groups. In this 
way, cue color was predictive of the possibility of earning or 
avoiding losing money, while target color was not.
Based on the partly opposing observations of the stud-
ies mentioned above, we can generate several hypotheses 
with respect to our main research question: Considering 
that incentive valence is signaled by advance cues (i.e., 
orthogonal to action information) and that the common goal 
is to respond fast and accurately, it seems likely that both 
reward and punishment cues would facilitate performance 
in a strategic, goal-directed manner, independent of the 
required action. Alternatively, since we are probing a more 
intuitive representation of approach/avoidance behavior 
(animated joystick task) to match studies that found robust 
valence–action mappings in the emotional domain, we might 
observe differential effects of reward and punishment cues 
in approach and avoid trials—even if valence and action 
signals are separated in time. Regarding our second, more 
exploratory research question, we expect that task-irrelevant 
but coincidental valence associations with the target would 
trigger valence–action biases, as reflected in facilitation 
of approach responses in the reward group and facilitation 
of avoid responses in the punishment group. To test these 
hypotheses, the main statistical tests for both research ques-
tions (cue valence and target–valence associations) are the 
interactions between valence, response type, and group. 
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Specifically, while a three-way interaction between these 
factors would provide evidence for a ‘signed’ valence–action 
bias (opposite direction for reward and punishment), a two-
way interaction between valence and response type across 
groups would index an ‘unsigned’ bias (same direction for 
reward and punishment). Finally, the absence of such inter-
actions would suggest the absence of a valence–action bias. 
To preempt the results, we did not find any indication for 
valence–action biases for advance incentive valence cues 
(neither signed nor unsigned), but observed an unsigned 
bias for coincidental incentive valence associations with 
the target.
Methods
Participants
Eighty participants took part in the present study. One half 
was assigned to the reward group (n = 40, 29 females, mean 
age ± SD 22.1 ± 2.8, age range 18–29), and the other half to 
the punishment group (n = 39, 28 females, mean age ± SD 
20.9 ± 2.5, age range 18–28). Data from one participant 
(punishment group) were excluded due to a large amount 
of too late responses (> 35%). The initial inclusion criteria 
were age between 18 and 35 years, right-handedness, nor-
mal color perception, normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
and no (history of) diagnosed mental disorders. The study 
was approved by the local ethics board and written informed 
consent was obtained from all participants in advance of 
participation. All procedures were in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki from 1964 and its later amend-
ments. Participants received 5 euro as base reimbursement 
for 30 min plus an average bonus of 2.40 euro in the reward 
group, and 2.43 euro in the punishment group.
Paradigm and procedure
Participants performed an approach/avoidance task in which 
push and pull responses were administered by means of a 
joystick (Fig. 1). A small white fixation cross was main-
tained in the upper half of a black screen throughout the 
experiment. In each trial, participants first saw a colored cue 
(square, 200 ms) indicating reward or punishment prospect, 
which was followed by the presentation of a small mani-
kin and a target stimulus (ellipse) after a variable interval 
(500–1500 ms). Participants were instructed to respond to 
the orientation of this target stimulus, which could be either 
Fig. 1  Schematic trial overview. Participants were presented with 
color cues (square). One of the cue colors (blue/pink) indicated 
reward prospect (reward group) or punishment prospect (punishment 
group), while the other color indicated the absence of reward or pun-
ishment prospect (neutral cue). After a variable interval, a manikin 
appeared together with the target (ellipse), and participants were 
instructed to respond to the orientation of the target (vertical = push/
approach, horizontal = pull/avoid) as fast as possible. The target could 
be independently drawn in blue or pink as well, but target color was 
entirely task-irrelevant. Correct in-time responses were followed by a 
response-congruent movement of the manikin. The figure illustrates 
two correct trials, with dotted arrows serving as illustration (not pre-
sented during the experiment). Incorrect or too late responses were 
followed by a black screen showing a white cross or clock, respec-
tively
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oriented vertically (requiring a push response) or horizon-
tally (requiring a pull response), and which was presented 
until the response was made, or for maximal 1200 ms. When 
responding correct and fast enough, the manikin animation 
moved in the selected direction on the screen for 300 ms, 
serving as ‘correct’ feedback. When responding incorrectly 
or too late, the target disappeared and participants saw a 
white colored cross or a clock image for 300 ms, serving as 
‘incorrect’ and ‘too late’ feedback, respectively. After a vari-
able interval of 1500–3000 ms, the next trial was presented.
While one of the two cue colors (i.e., blue or pink) was 
predicting reward prospect in the reward group or punish-
ment prospect in the punishment group, the other color indi-
cated neutral, no-incentive trials. Cue color-valence map-
pings were counterbalanced across participants within each 
group. In the reward group, participants were informed that 
they would start with 0 euro beyond the base compensation, 
and that they could win bonus money during the experiment, 
while in the punishment group, participants were informed 
that they would start with 3 euro, and that they should try to 
avoid losing money during the experiment. When respond-
ing correct and fast enough to a target stimulus that was pre-
ceded by a reward cue (reward group), participants earned a 
reward of 2 cents. Slow or incorrect responses after reward 
cues, as well as responses following neutral cues did not 
affect the monetary outcome. In contrast, when participants 
responded slow or incorrect to a target preceded by a punish-
ment cue (punishment group), they lost 2 cents. Correct and 
in-time responses after punishment cues as well as responses 
following neutral cues did not affect the monetary outcome. 
To motivate all participants to perform the experiment in 
a similar way, a staircase procedure was applied, which 
dynamically adjusted the response deadline on the basis of 
participants’ individual performance (Cornsweet, 1962). 
This procedure was set to yield 80% correct feedback per 
experimental condition.1 Importantly, all responses in a fixed 
window between 150 and 1200 ms after target onset were 
considered for the analysis—regardless of the staircasing 
procedure.
To get familiar with the experiment and the different cue 
color meanings, participants started with a short training 
sequence of eight trials. Afterwards, three experimental 
blocks of 104 trials were performed, which were separated 
from each other by short breaks. During these breaks, par-
ticipants were informed about their accuracy (based on the 
feedback provided to them during the experiment) and the 
total amount of money earned or preserved so far.
The number of trials was equally distributed over eight 
conditions. Conditions were formed by combinations of the 
factors Cue valence (cue color), Target valence association 
(target color), and Response type (target orientation). Cue 
colors signaled reward/punishment prospect (reward/pun-
ishment cue vs. neutral cue), target colors could be reward/
punishment-associated or not, and the response type could 
be push (‘approach’, vertical target) or pull (‘avoid’, horizon-
tal target). Importantly, only the cue color was actually pre-
dicting reward/punishment prospect, while target color was 
entirely task-irrelevant. This information was made explicit 
to the participants.
Data analyses
RTs (correct trials only), response error rates (in-time 
responses), and inverse efficiency scores (RT divided by pro-
portion of correct responses, cf. Bruyer and Brysbaert 2011) 
were submitted to a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated-measures analysis of 
variance (rANOVA) with factors Cue valence (valence/
non-valence cue), Target  valence association (valence-
associated/non-valence-associated target) and Response type 
(approach/avoidance) as within-subject factors, and Group 
(reward group/punishment group) as between-subject factor. 
Note that in these analyses, the factor Cue valence reflects 
reward in the reward group and punishment in punishment 
group (the same logic applies to the factor Target valence 
association). As noted above, the main focus in the analysis 
is to test for interactions between Cue valence, Response 
type, and Group, as well as between Target valence asso-
ciation, Response type, and Group. Other interactions and 
main effects are reported and discussed for a comprehensive 
overview of the data pattern.
Results
Response times (RTs)
Mean RTs are depicted in Fig. 2. Responses in the reward 
group were globally faster than those of the punishment 
group (main effect of Group: F(1, 77) = 4.94, p = .029; 
η2p = .060), and approach (push) responses were globally 
1 For the first 20 participants of the reward group, a single dynami-
cally adjusted response interval was applied across all conditions. To 
prevent biasing of specific conditions by presenting participants with 
lower rates of correct feedback for conditions with higher average 
RTs, we changed the program to apply condition-specific response 
intervals in the rest of the experiment. Statistical testing (one-stair-
case vs. condition-specific staircases) revealed only a marginal sig-
nificant Cue valence × Target valence association × Staircase proce-
dure interaction in the RT data: F(1, 38) = 3.41, p = .073; η2p = .082, 
indicating that this interaction was weaker for the one-staircase pro-
cedure: F(1, 19) = 0.99, p = .33; η2p = .049 than for the condition-
specific procedure: F(1, 19) = 13.07, p = .002; η2p = .407. Further-
more, no differences between the first 20 participants (one-staircase) 
and the second 20 participants (condition-specific staircases) within 
the win-valence group were observed in the RT or error rate data (all 
p > .199).
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faster than avoid (pull) responses (main effect of Response 
type: F(1, 77) = 141.48, p < .001; η2p = .648). Moreover, 
valence cues led to faster responses as compared to neutral 
cues (main effect of Cue valence: F(1, 77) = 121.34, p < .001; 
η2p = .612), and this facilitation was stronger in the punish-
ment compared to the reward group (Cue valence × Group: 
F(1, 77) = 5.29, p = .024; η2p = .064). Moreover, Cue 
valence interacted with Target valence association: F(1, 
77) = 22.93, p < .001; η2p = .229, reflecting that the overall 
facilitation elicited by valence cues was further enhanced 
by the presence of valence-associated targets across 
groups. Regarding the main research question, concern-
ing the effect of cue valence on approach/avoid responses, 
we did not find evidence for valence–action biases (Cue 
valence × Response type × Group: F(1, 77) = 0.42, p = .521; 
η2p = .005; Cue valence × Response type: F(1, 77) = 0.15, 
p = .7; η2p = .002). Rather, reward and punishment cues 
affected both approach and avoid trials in a similar manner. 
Fig. 2  RT results. The figure presents the mean RTs for approach responses (left) and avoid responses (right) for the reward group (top) and the 
punishment group (bottom). Error bars indicate SE of the means
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With regard to the second research question, concerning the 
effect of target valence associations, we observed an interac-
tion between Target valence association and Response type: 
F(1, 77) = 25.26, p < .001; η2p = .247. Specifically, we found 
that valence-associated targets (as compared to neutral ones) 
led to response facilitation in approach trials: t(78) = − 6.02, 
p < .001, but to response slowing in avoid trials: t(78) = 2.64, 
p = .010. Importantly, however, this pattern did not differ 
between groups (Target valence association × Response 
type × Group: F(1, 77) = 0.61, p = .436; η2p = .008). 
Finally, a three-way interaction was observed between Cue 
valence × Target valence association × Response type: F(1, 
77) = 7.35, p = .008; η2p = .087, which was due to a differ-
ential interaction between Cue valence and Target valence 
association in approach (F(1, 77) = 26.94, p < .001; 
η2p = .259) as compared to avoid responses (F(1, 77) = 1.85, 
p = .177; η2p = .024), reflecting that additional facilitation by 
valence-associated targets following valence cues was only 
observed in approach trials (Fig. 2). All remaining effects 
did not reach significance (all p > .181).
To summarize the main findings regarding the effects 
of Cue valence and Target valence association, we calcu-
lated RT difference values (incentive minus neutral trials) 
for each factor separately (Fig. 4a). These plots illustrate 
that incentive cues (grey bars) affect both action types in 
form of a global performance benefit (neither signed nor 
unsigned valence–action bias), and that valence-associated 
targets (black bars) modulate approach and avoid responses 
differently (benefit approach, impair avoid), but regardless of 
absolute valence (unsigned valence–action bias). Note that 
these plots merely serve to illustrate the main effects of the 
two incentive factors in relation to Response type and Group.
Error rates
Mean error rates are depicted in Fig. 3. Error rates were 
slightly lower in the punishment compared to the reward 
group (trend for a main effect of Group: F(1, 77) = 3.72, 
p = .057; η2p = .046), indexing a performance benefit that is 
in opposite direction compared to the RT data. Like in the 
RT data, performance was improved after valence cues (main 
effect of Cue valence: F(1, 77) = 13.81, p < .001; η2p = .151). 
Again, there was no indication for a valence–action bias 
(Cue valence × Response type × Group: F(1, 77) = 1.18, 
p = .281; η2p = .015; Cue valence × Response type: F(1, 
77) = 1.07, p = .304; η2p = .014), indicating that reward and 
punishment cues affected both approach and avoid responses 
in a similar way. Regarding the effects of valence-associated 
targets, the groups differed at trend level (Target valence 
association × Group: F(1, 77) = 2.79, p = .099; η2p = .035), 
which is the consequence of a slight error reduction for 
punishment-associated targets compared to a slight error 
increase for reward-associated targets. Similar to the RT 
data, Target valence association interacted with Response 
type: F(1, 77) = 26.32, p < .001; η2p = .243, indicating that 
valence-associated targets (compared to neutral ones) led to 
error reduction in approach trials: t(78) = − 3.62, p < .001, 
and error increase in avoid trials: t(78) = 3.61, p < .001. 
Finally, we found a significant three-way interaction of 
Target valence association × Response type × Group: F(1, 
77) = 5.07, p = .027; η2p = .047, indicating that valence 
associations carried by the target facilitated approach and 
impaired avoid responses stronger in the reward group [F(1, 
39) = 22.51, p < .001; η2p = .366)] an in the punishment 
group [F(1, 38) = 5.32, p = .027; η2p = .123; Fig. 3], sug-
gesting that the reward-approach mapping might overall be 
more robust. All remaining effects did not reach significance 
(all p > .135).
Effects of Cue valence and Target valence association 
are summarized by calculating error rate difference val-
ues (incentive minus neutral trials) for both factors sepa-
rately (Fig. 4b). While incentive cues (grey bars) promote 
a general performance benefit (neither signed nor unsigned 
valence–action bias), valence-associated targets (black bars) 
affected approach and avoid responses differently (benefit 
approach, impair avoid). While this pattern was observed 
in both groups (unsigned valence–action bias), the bias was 
more pronounced in the reward group. Note that these plots 
merely serve to illustrate the main effects of the two incen-
tive factors in relation to Response type and Group.
Speed–accuracy relationship
In addition to RT and error rate measures, an analysis of 
inverse efficiency scores was performed. These scores are 
calculated by dividing RT by the proportion of correct 
responses, and are used to provide an integrated performance 
measure that is sensitive to potential speed–accuracy trade-
offs (Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011). A Cue valence × Group 
interaction was observed: F(1, 77) = 6.68, p = .012; 
η2p = .080, again indicating that the data were more strongly 
modulated by Cue valence information in the punishment 
group than in the reward group. Furthermore, the Tar-
get  valence association × Group interaction was almost 
significant: F(1, 77) = 3.96, p = .05; η2p = .049, confirm-
ing the slightly different impact of Target valence asso-
ciation in the punishment group compared to the reward 
group. The three-way interaction Target valence associa-
tion × Response type × Group that was observed in the error 
rate data was present in the inverse efficiency scores as 
well: F(1, 77) = 5.17, p = .026; η2p = .063, indicating that the 
approach bias was more pronounced in the reward group 
[F(1, 39) = 31.30, p < .001; η2p = .445)] than in the punish-
ment group [F(1, 38) = 6.26, p = .017; η2p = .141)]. Overall, 
when combining RT and accuracy in one score, the main 
result patterns are preserved, suggesting that the results are 
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not driven by a differential speed–accuracy trade-off in the 
different trial types.
Discussion
In the present study, we combined a cued monetary incen-
tive paradigm with an approach/avoidance joystick task to 
study the interaction between incentive valence (between-
group factor) and action information (within-group factor). 
Importantly, in contrast to the previous studies, reward/pun-
ishment valence information (cue color) and action require-
ment (target orientation) were separated in time and orthog-
onal to one another, so that the mapping could change from 
trial to trial. Moreover, we used an animated joystick task 
with approach (push) versus avoid (pull) responses instead 
of button presses vs. withholding of button presses, which 
should be more sensitive to pick up fairly natural approach/
avoidance tendencies in response to incentive valence stim-
uli. Finally, on a more exploratory note, target stimuli could 
Fig. 3  Error rate results. The figure presents the mean error rates for approach responses (left) and avoid responses (right) for the reward group 
(top) and the punishment group (bottom). Error bars indicate SE of the means
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carry task-irrelevant incentive valence information (target 
color) to test whether task-relevance is a perquisite to pro-
duce incentive valence–action biases.
The results showed that both reward and punishment cues 
(see grey bars in Fig. 4) improved performance with respect 
to the neutral conditions in the respective group, regardless 
of the required action (approach/avoid). In contrast, task-
irrelevant valence associations carried by the target (see 
black bars in Fig. 4) produced an unsigned valence–action 
bias in both groups, with reward/punishment-associated 
targets leading to response facilitation in approach trials, 
but to performance decrements in avoid trials. This over-
all bias across positive and negative incentive valence is in 
contrast to emotional valence–action biases, where positive 
and negative stimuli lead to opposite action tendencies (e.g., 
Chen & Bargh, 1999; Krieglmeyer et al., 2010). In sum, 
valence cues largely improved performance regardless of 
response requirements (i.e., no valence–action bias), while 
Fig. 4  Collapsed RT (a) and error rate (b) results. Difference values 
(incentive minus neutral) are averaged for valence cues (grey bars) 
and valence-associated targets (black bars) and depicted separately 
for approach/avoid responses in the two groups. Error bars indicate 
SE of the means
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both types of valence-associated targets promoted approach 
and impaired avoid responses (i.e., unsigned valence–action 
bias). In the following, we discuss these observations in 
more detail with reference to the existing research.
Effects of incentive cues
First, we observed general response facilitation elicited by 
cue valence in both groups, as reflected in shorter response 
times without sacrificing response accuracy. Despite the 
overall similarity, this cuing effect was more pronounced 
in the punishment group, indicating that negative-valence 
cues had a stronger impact on task preparation, which might 
reflect an asymmetry in which loss avoidance manipulations 
are globally more motivating, despite of the same absolute 
value being at stake. This observation is generally in line 
with earlier work describing stronger effects for negative as 
compared to positive valence in different task contexts (for 
review, see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 
2001). However, others have not found significant perfor-
mance differences between reward and punishment cues 
(e.g., Engelmann et al., 2009; Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; 
Novak & Foti, 2015), suggesting that the global incentive 
cueing benefit across reward and punishment cues might 
be more robust, and that the additional benefit of negative 
incentive cues might be less reliable and dependent on the 
nature of the task (of note, the before-mentioned studies 
that did not observe differential effects all employed vis-
ual discrimination tasks). More important with regard to 
our research question was the observation that the incen-
tive-based performance benefit (signaled by the cue) was 
independent of the required action, which was signaled to 
participants after a temporal delay by a different stimulus 
(target). The absence of valence–action biases under these 
circumstances suggests that these might only occur when 
both types of information coincide in time as was the case 
in the studies of Guitart-Masip et al. (2012), Cavanagh et al. 
(2013) and Richter et al. (2014), which all featured cues 
of unique valence–action mappings and found predicted 
valence–action biases. These paradigms are in contrast to 
the changing trial-by-trial combinations of valence (cue) and 
action (target) information in the present study. We would 
argue that incentive cues in the present paradigm promote 
more strategic, goal-directed processes, which are identical 
for both reward and punishment cues, rendering the occur-
rence of fairly automatic response biases, like observed for 
emotional events (Phaf et al., 2014), less likely.
Interestingly, comparable effects evoked by both reward 
and punishment incentives as observed in the present study 
have been reported by Verbruggen and McLaren (2016) 
using a selective stop-change task, which requires partici-
pants to execute a certain response in the majority of the Go 
trials, but switch to an alternative response in a subset of 
the trials (upon presentation of a stop-change signal). While 
reward and punishment prospect were manipulated in differ-
ent groups like in the present study, they were active for the 
entire task (sustained) rather than being signaled by a cue in 
each trial. Compared to a control group that did not receive 
any incentive instructions, both incentive groups displayed 
behavioral modulations in the form of strategic slowing on 
regular Go trials and response facilitation in stop-change 
trials, with no indication for a difference between reward 
and punishment incentives (see also earlier reports by Engel-
mann et al., 2009; Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Novak & 
Foti, 2015). Together, these observations suggest that in situ-
ations in which reward and punishment are signaled by a cue 
or provided in a sustained fashion across blocks of trials, 
similar preparatory or strategic processes are triggered to 
obtain the task goal (i.e., ‘respond fast and accurate to win 
or keep the money’)—regardless of the type of valence, and 
even if the task itself can be regarded as highly sensitive to 
pick up natural response biases as evidenced by studies in 
the emotional domain (e.g., Krieglmeyer et al., 2010).
Effects of task‑irrelevant incentive associations 
with the target
Second, task-irrelevant valence associations with the target 
stimulus triggered unsigned valence–action biases, in that 
both reward and punishment valence associations facilitated 
approach responses, but impaired avoid responses. Consider-
ing the reward group alone, similar reward-approach biases 
have been reported before in different experimental designs 
(Chen & Bargh, 1999; Freeman et al., 2014; Guitart-Masip 
et al., 2012; Wirth, Dignath, Pfister, Kunde, & Eder, 2016), 
and these seem to be comparable to biases triggered posi-
tive emotional stimuli (De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & 
Hermans, 2001; Solarz, 1960), as well as dispositions to 
approach appetitive stimuli that are considered unhealthy 
(e.g., Becker et al., 2015; Wiers et al., 2009). Intriguingly, 
and in contrast to our hypothesis, a similar approach bias 
for incentive valence-associated targets was observed in the 
punishment group. Specifically, we expected to observe an 
approach bias for targets associated with positive incentive 
valence (reward), while negative incentive valence (punish-
ment) was expected to produce the opposite bias (with per-
formance facilitation in avoid trials and performance decre-
ment in approach trials), in line with the previous reports 
using a Go/noGo task design (e.g., Guitart-Masip et al., 
2012; Richter et al., 2014). We think that the explanation 
for this unexpected finding is related to the composition of 
conditions between groups. First, while positive and nega-
tive valence stimuli were directly contrasted by Guitart-
Masip et al. (2012), we compared the effects of positive and 
negative incentive valence to a neutral baseline condition, 
and hence, each group only encountered one type of valence. 
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It may be argued that similarities in the effects of reward 
and punishment manipulations are the consequence of the 
absence of an explicit valence contrast. While participants in 
the reward group may feel ‘punished’ when they did not earn 
a reward in some trials, participants in the punishment group 
might feel ‘rewarded’ when they successfully avoided a loss 
(Kim, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2006). Second, while in the 
study by Guitart-Masip et al. (2012), Go and noGo responses 
were leading to reward and punishments with equal prob-
ability, withholding a response was never beneficial for 
participants in our study, thereby potentially promoting a 
global approach bias for all incentive trials. Considering 
the absence of a direct valence contrast and the emphasis 
on response execution in our design, it is likely that each 
incentive valence was coded as the one salient signal to pay 
attention to during the task, and to respond to fast, regardless 
of absolute value. That said, albeit present in both groups, 
the approach bias for incentive valence signals was in fact 
more pronounced in the reward group’s error rate data, pro-
viding some evidence for a more robust mapping between 
approach and reward-associated target features, above and 
beyond largely overlapping performance modulations.
From a more general perspective, performance costs 
elicited by task-irrelevant valence signals (here, in avoid 
trials) are not unique to this study. For example, perfor-
mance impairments due to task-irrelevant valence signals 
have been found in a rewarded Stroop task, where reward-
related irrelevant semantic information led to stronger inter-
ference (Krebs et al., 2011, 2010), as well as in visual search 
tasks where spatial attention was biased towards irrelevant 
reward-related features (Anderson, Laurent, Yantis, Grados, 
& Umaña, 2011; Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011). In the 
latter studies, attentional capture triggered by stimuli that 
have been associated with positive (Anderson, Laurent, & 
Yantis, 2011; Sali, Anderson, & Yantis, 2014) or negative 
incentive valence (Müller, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2016; 
Wentura, Müller, & Rothermund, 2014) can either benefit 
or impair performance depending on whether the valence 
feature is overlapping with the target or distractor of a visual 
search display. Here, we observe a similar bias in the domain 
of action tendencies, in that targets featuring salient informa-
tion are more easily approached than avoided—even if this 
is detrimental for the task goal.
Interactions between cue and target effects, 
and global group differences
In both groups, we observed that task-irrelevant valence 
associations with the target further augmented performance 
benefits induced by valence cues. This might indicate that 
an increase of attention during the cue–target interval led to 
a prioritization of any salient subsequent stimulus. Alterna-
tively, or in addition, the observed additive effect of cue and 
target valence could reflect low-level feature priming effects, 
because the specific color of the cue is repeated in the target 
(Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010; Logan, 1990; Schacter & 
Buckner, 1998). In order to differentiate between unspecific 
attentional prioritization and specific feature priming (e.g., 
Grison & Strayer, 2001; Waszak & Hommel, 2007) in these 
specific conditions, one would need a paradigm in which 
feature repetitions are excluded by design. That said, we 
would not assume that the effects of target–valence asso-
ciations observed in the present study could be entirely 
explained by attentional prioritization or feature priming 
due to the preceding valence cues. Most importantly, mere 
feature (or value) priming would predict performance ben-
efits for feature repetitions across conditions—instead, we 
observe that facilitation was driven by other factors, inde-
pendent of repetition. This is most evident when comparing 
the combination of reward cue target–reward association in 
approach vs. avoidance trials, which feature performance 
benefits and costs, respectively (Fig. 4).
In addition to trial-by-trial modulations triggered by cue 
valence and target–valence associations, and their interac-
tion, the result pattern is indicative of global differences 
between the reward and punishment group. Specifically, 
when considering the RT data, there is a global offset in 
speed, with faster responses in the reward compared to the 
punishment group. Conversely, in the error rate data, we find 
an opposite global effect (at trend level), with fewer errors 
in the punishment compared to the reward group. Such con-
text effects seem to resonate with the notion that a reward 
context might particularly promote fast responses, while a 
punishment context can promote cautious responding, which 
has been demonstrated in a context where punishment rate 
increased over time (Griffiths & Beierholm, 2017). Notably, 
these global changes seem to occur more or less indepen-
dently of incentive-based performance benefits from trial to 
trial. For example, while the reward group is faster globally 
(context effect), participants in the punishment group benefit 
more from incentive cues (trial-by-trial effect).
Conclusion
Incentive valence information in the cue operated rather stra-
tegically, and was overall beneficial in nature. Furthermore, 
as incentive valence information in the cue was not further 
affected by the required action (i.e., no valence–action bias), 
this seems to suggest that valence–action biases may rely 
on the temporal coincidence (or other dependence) between 
valence and action information, and that the current orthogo-
nal design emphasizes more strategic influences of incentive 
cues. The influence of irrelevant valence information linked 
to the target itself, however, seemed to be rather automatic 
in nature, in that incentive signals promoted approach over 
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avoid responses (even if this was not beneficial)—and this 
effect was fairly independent of the actual valence sign 
(i.e., unsigned valence–action bias). This rather unexpected 
finding might be related to the valence-to-neutral contrast 
in both groups and the common goal to respond fast in all 
incentive trials. As such, the results of the present study pro-
vide insights into the complex interplay between incentive 
valence and action signals, and seem to challenge the notion 
that monetary incentives trigger ‘hard-wired’ valence–action 
biases in that specific design choices seem to modulate the 
presence and/or direction of valence–action biases.
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